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Assessment of Shelf Registration:
How Much Diligence is Due Investors?
Investment Banking and Diligence: What Price Deregulation?, by
Joseph Auerbach* and Samuel Hayes, III." Boston, Massachusetts: Harvard Business School Press, 1986. 274 pages. $24.95.
Roberta S. Karmelt
It has been over four years since the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) adopted its controversial Rule 415,1 commonly known as the
Shelf Registration Rule. Under the Shelf Registration Rule, eligible public issuers2 may file a single registration statement for a class of debt or
equity securities and then sell the securities on a non-fixed price basis at
any time during a maximum two-year period. While many commentators
have attempted to assess the Shelf Registration Rule's impact,8 the full
ramifications of the Rule for investor protection have yet tobe determined.
The Shelf Registration Rule is but one component of the SEC's integrated
disclosure system, a deregulatory initiative begun during the Carter
Class of 1957 Professor of Business Administration, Harvard Business School.
* Jacob H. Schiff Professor of Investment Banking, Harvard Business School.
t Former Commissioner, Securities and Exchange Commission (1977-1980); Professor, Brooklyn
Law School; of counsel, Rogers & Wells, New York, N.Y.
1. 17 C.F.R. § 230.415 (1985). The Shelf Registration Rule was adopted on a temporary basis in
1982 by SEC Securities Act Release No. 6383, reprinted in (1937-1982 Accounting Series Releases
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 72,328 (March 3, 1982). Following a trial period
during which public comments were received, the Shelf Registration rule was formally adopted by
SEC Securities Act Release No. 6499, reprinted in [1983-1984 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) V 83,449, at 86,335 (Nov. 17, 1983).
2. In general, companies eligible for shelf registration include U.S. corporations which have had a
class of equity securities registered pursuant to the 1934 Act for three years or more and have made
all required annual and periodic filings under the 1934 Act in a timely manner, have not defaulted on
preferred stock dividends, debt or other long term obligations, and meet certain dollar standards for
the aggregate market value of voting stock. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.415, 239.13 (defining securities
eligible to be registered on Form S-3) (1985).
3. See, e.g., Banoff, Regulatory Subsidies, Efficient Markets, and Shelf Registration: An Analysis
of Rule 415, 70 VA. L. REV. 135 (1984) (rule benefits both issuers and investors); Feeney, The Saga
of Rule 415: Registrationfor the Shelf, 9 CORP. L. REV. 41 (1986) (rule is beneficial and its availability should be extended); Fox, Shelf Registration, Integrated Disclosure, and Underwriter Due
Diligence: An Economic Analysis, 70 VA. L. REV. 1005 (1984) (shelf registration is harmful to investors and the economy); Note, The Impact of the SEC's Shelf Registration Rule on Underwriters' Due
DiligenceInvestigations, 51 GEO. L. REV. 767 (1983) (shelf registration is inconsistent with securities
laws' disclosure policies); Note, The Impact of the SEC's Rule 415 on Individual Investors, 46 OHIo
ST. L.J. 223 (1985) (while rule benefits issuers, investors may be unable to obtain adequate
information).
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Administration' and put into final form under the leadership of SEC
Chairman John S.R. Shad during the Reagan Administration.' The integrated disclosure system is designed to avoid unnecessary corporate disclosure by permitting issuers to incorporate periodic reports made under
the Securities Exchange Act of 19346 ("1934 Act") into Securities Act of
19337 ("1933 Act") registration statements.8
The Shelf Registration Rule was adopted in the face of serious opposition from the investment banking establishment.9 In addition, Commissioner Barbara Thomas dissented in part from the Rule's adoption,
expressing the belief that shelf registration of equity offerings would reduce the quality and timeliness of disclosure and further the trend toward
institutionalization of securities holders, to the detriment of individual investors.10 Although the Shelf Registration Rule is now widely used in
both equity and debt underwritings, doubts about the Rule's possibly adverse side effects have continued.
1 is an
Investment Banking and Diligence: What Price Deregulation?"
attempt to explain the economic and political developments that led to the
adoption of the Shelf Registration Rule and to assess the impact of the
Rule on investor protection. Joseph Auerbach and Samuel L. Hayes, III
share the reservations expressed by Commissioner Thomas in her dissent
to the adoption of the Shelf Registration Rule and conclude that the Rule
is harmful to both investors and investment bankers. Their own recommendations for reform, however, would not be likely to halt the
4. See R. KARMEL, REGULATION BY PROSECUTION 259-64 (1982).
5. The SEC's proposals for an integrated disclosure system are contained in SEC Securities Act
Release Nos. 6331-38, reprinted in SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 616, spc'l supp. (Aug. 12,
1981). Integrated disclosure was adopted in SEC Securities Act Release No. 6383, reprinted in
[1937-1982 Accounting Series Releases Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 72,328, at
62,990 (Mar. 3, 1982). Chairman Shad initially recused himself from participating in deliberations on
the Shelf Registration Rule, but concurred in its adoption as a final rule, writing a special concurring
opinion. SEC Securities Act Release No. 6499, reprinted in [1983-1984 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC.
L. REP. (CCH) 83,449, at 86,346 (Nov. 17, 1983) (Shad, Chairman, concurring).
6. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1982).
7. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77bbbb (1982).
8. See R. KARMEL, supra note 4; Nicholas, The Integrated Disclosure System and Its Impact on
Underwriters' Due Diligence: Will Investors Be Protected?, 11 SEC. REG. L.J. 3, 3-6 (1983).
9. See, e.g., Osborn, The FurorOver Shelf Registration, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, June 1982,
at 61.
10. SEC Securities Act Release No. 6499, reprinted in [1983-1984 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC.
L. REP. (CCH)
83,449, at 86,346 (Nov. 17, 1983) (Thomas, Comm'r, concurring in part and
dissenting in part). See also SEC Securities Act Release No. 6423, reprinted in [1982 Transfer
Binder] FED. SE. L. REP. (CCH) 83,250, at 85,279 (Sept. 2, 1982) (extension of temporary Rule
415) (Thomas, Comm'r, dissenting).
11. J. AUERBACH & S. HAYES, III, INVESTMENT BANKING AND DILIGENCE: WHAT PRICE
DEREGULATION? (1986) [hereinafter cited by page number only].
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institutionalization"' of the securities markets, to which shelf registration
seems more a response than a cause.
I.

Development of an Integrated Disclosure System

The authors of Investment Banking and Diligence: What Price Deregulation? do an excellent job of explaining the background to the adoption
of the Shelf Registration Rule. In general, the book is clear, concise, and
easy to read. The Appendices include a helpful glossary of terms and a
sample of underwriting documents." Hayes and Auerbach trace the developments in the securities markets leading up to the passage of the 1933
Act and the 1934 Act.14 They conclude that the Securities Acts were based
on a policy of "regulation by information" designed to ensure investor
confidence, even if at the expense of lost efficiency.' 8 The authors' concern
with full and accurate disclosure underlies the book's detailed treatment of
the due diligence procedures that were adopted by investment banks in
response to the passage of the 1933 Act." The authors also address the
evolution of the securities markets since the passage of the 1933 Act,"
properly focusing upon the institutionalization of the securities markets
and the power which this has given customers to dictate the terms of
underwriting transactions to investment bankers. This development led
both to the formation of multi-service financial firms which are supplanting the traditional investment banking houses and to a pressure for
lower underwriting fees.
The second half of the book is devoted in part to a discussion of the
movement toward integration of 1933 Act and 1934 Act disclosure
requirements,' 8 which culminated in 1982 with the introduction of shelf
registration. Both the Shelf Registration Rule and related SEC rules permitting the integration of disclosure requirements under the 1933 Act and
1934 Act were in part a response to marketplace pressures for speedier,
more flexible underwriting arrangements. These SEC regulations enable
issuers to shelf register offerings and take advantage of windows in the
capital markets to effectuate financings on a day's notice. Auerbach and
Hayes recognize that part of the impetus for these developments was
12. Institutional investors accounted for only 25% of the public volume on the New York Stock
Exchange in'1953; by 1980 this figure had grown to 65%. In 1980, 50% of institutional-owned NYSE
listed equity assets were held by noninsured corporate pension funds, 15% by insurance companies,
10% each by investment companies and nonprofit institutions, and 13% by foreign institutions. P. 97.
13. Pp. 205-66.
14. Pp. 8-61.
15. Pp. 57-58.
16. Pp. 62-84.
17. Pp. 85-107.
18. Pp. 108-122.
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activity in the Eurosecurities markets and the need for U.S. underwriters
to tap the U.S. markets as quickly and efficiently as the markets in
Europe were being tapped.1 9
The adoption of an integrated disclosure system by the SEC in turn
accelerated ongoing developments in the marketplace. No doubt it was in
part the recognition of these trends and the adverse impact this could have
on some firms that led to opposition by investment banks to the Shelf
Registration Rule. For example, Morgan Stanley & Co., Inc. was one of
the most vocal opponents of the Shelf Registration Rule.20 In the years
following the adoption of the Rule, Morgan Stanley was the most prominent loser among lead underwriting firms, falling from a fifteen percent
market share in 1979 to a seven percent share in 1984.2"
After discussing the developments surrounding adoption of the Shelf
Registration Rule, 2 the authors undertake an analysis of the types of issuers that currently qualify to issue securities under' the Rule."3 The purpose of their analysis is to determine the extent to which issuers under the
Shelf Registration Rule fit the ideal profile of a large, stable public company about which a large volume of information is publicly disseminated.
Finally, Hayes and Auerbach analyze the impact of the Shelf Registration
Rule and propose modifications to current shelf registration procedures."4
They are less successful in assessing the impact of the Shelf Registration
Rule, however, than they are in describing the trends in the securities
markets that led to its adoption.
II.

The Impact of the Shelf Registration Rule On Underwriter Due
Diligence

Auerbach and Hayes devote much of their book to an analysis of the
impact of the Shelf Registration Rule on the underwriting process. Their
primary conclusion is that inadequate due diligence investigations undertaken by investment banks as a result of the Shelf Registration Rule-the
result of the very short time between the decision to issue securities and
their sale-are likely to have a deleterious effect on investor protection.
There is very little analysis in the book, however, of the actual impact of
the Shelf Registration Rule on the quality of information contained in
19. P. 124.
20. P. 172, n.8, citing 15 SEc. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 45, 2104 (Nov. 18, 1983).
21. P. 135. It is interesting to note that Morgan Stanley has now gone public, demonstrating a
need to diversify and raise capital which deregulation generally seems to spawn. See Monroe, Morgan
Stanley Initial Offering Is a Hit as Firm's Stock Soars in Early Trading, Wall St. J., Mar. 24, 1986,
at 5,col.
1.
22. Pp. 123-44.
23. Pp. 145-174.
24. Pp. 174-199.
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registration statements. The empirical evidence in support of their conclusion is inadequate; the best they can come up with is an analysis of companies eligible for shelf registration which indicates that such issuers vary
widely with respect to size, operating performance, capital structure, and
stock market performance, and that not all of them are necessarily followed by financial analysts.""
Based on their assumption that the markets for the securities of some of
the issuers eligible for shelf registration are not efficient, 6 Auerbach and
Hayes conclude that normal due diligence procedures-not the abbreviated procedures prevalent under the Shelf Registration Rule-are necessary to ensure adequate investor protection.27 The authors' skepticism of
the efficient market theory may well be justified: The notion that the securities markets are efficient remains controversial. Indeed, a primary justification for the federal securities laws is the inefficiency of the markets
and the need to mandate disclosure because investors would otherwise be
unable to obtain information necessary for them to have confidence in the
securities markets. 8 Yet, although the SEC paid lip service to the efficient
market theory in promulgating the Shelf Registration Rule, this change in
the nature of SEC processing of underwriting documents rests on a firmer
foundation than a belief in efficient markets: It rests on a pragmatic recognition that the changed character of the securities markets requires flexible underwriting arrangements and integrated disclosure.
Auerbach and Hayes place too much emphasis on the Shelf Registration Rule itself. They fail to appreciate that the developments they
deplore-the abbreviation and erosion of the due diligence process-are
the result of a variety of legal and economic factors other than the Shelf
Registration Rule. Under the SEC's integrated disclosure system, most
public companies which have been in the SEC reporting system for three
or more years can incorporate by reference into registration statements
filed in connection with public offerings under the 1933 Act accounting
and other information contained in annual and periodic reports filed with
the SEC under the 1934 Act.2 9 This ability to incorporate information
created by the issuer and its accountants in documents which underwriters
must use in offerings has led to the dilemma of today's investment
bankers. That is, although the underwriters are still subject to liability
25. Pp. 163-173.
26. Pp. 165-72, 187. For discussions of the concept of market efficiency, see Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of the Theory and Empirical Work, 25 J. FIN. 383 (1970); Gilson &
Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549, 554-65 (1984).
27. Pp. 165-72.
28. See 6 SENATE COMM. ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 95TH CONG., 2D SESS., STUDY ON
FEDERAL REGULATION: FRAMEWORK FOR REGULATION 18-21 (Comm. Print 1978).
29. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 239.12 (Form S-2), 239.13 (Form S-3) (1985).
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under the 1933 Act-for which they have a due diligence defense available$-they are in many cases unable to persuade issuers to revise or
change information previously filed with the SEC.
Furthermore, 1934 Act filings are not reviewed and commented upon
by the SEC in the same manner that 1933 Act registration statements
traditionally have been, because such filings do not have to be declared
effective by the Commission. The SEC staff therefore has much less practical ability to change the form or content of corporate disclosure in
annual and periodic reports. To be amended, such disclosure would have
to be so clearly wrong as to justifiy an SEC enforcement action. The informal give and take between the SEC's staff and corporate counsel over
disclosure that used to be a part of the processing routine for public offerings no longer exists as to issuers which can incorporate 1934 Act filings
by reference in their public offerings. Moreover, the huge increase in the
total number of SEC filings both under the 1934 Act and 1933 Act, in a
period where there has been no increase in the number of SEC staffers,
makes the continuation of such processing techniques infeasible in any
event.
Shelf registration has undoubtedly exacerbated the problems of underwriter due diligence. Business conditions, however, are probably more
pertinent to these problems than changing legal requirements. Even if an
underwriter had a month instead of a few days, could an adequate due
diligence investigation of General Motors or IBM really be conducted?
Modern enterprise has become far too complex and large to be amenable
to old-fashioned due diligence. The SEC and the investing public have no
real alternative to relying on public corporations to have the integrity to
report adequately and accurately on their financial and business affairs.
III. Policy Implications
There is no question that underwriter due diligence procedures have
changed over the past decade. Despite the SEC's safe harbor Rule 176,1
however, which specifies due diligence standards, the SEC's shelf registration and integrated disclosure rules have not altered the liability provisions
of Section 11 of the 1933 Act that pertain to underwriters.3 " Yet, as
Auerbach and Hayes conclude, the specter of such liability may not be
"sufficient to influence underwriters' behavior decisively" because of- the
"competitive forces at work in the securities industry.""3 Moreover, they
30. 17 C.F.R. § 230.176 (1985).
31. Id.
32. 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1982).
33. P. 179.
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also conclude that various substitutes for old-fashioned due diligence that
have been suggested by the SEC, particularly market efficiency, are
insufficient."
Auerbach and Hayes make some policy proposals in response to the
problems they perceive with underwriter due diligence procedures under
the Shelf Registration Rule. First, they suggest that not all S-3 issuers"
should remain eligible for shelf registrations, but only "quality" issuers.
The SEC would measure quality rather like a rating agency does, with a
"formula embodying a number of investment quality earnings and assets
indices."" For the universe of lesser-quality issuers which the SEC
believes should be permitted to use an abbreviated registration process,
Auerbach and Hayes propose the authorization of "professional diligence
agencies" which would take the place of the investment bankers and counsel who have traditionally performed due diligence. These "professional
investigators" would be personally liable for failure of due diligence, and
7
the underwriter would be no longer so liable.These policy proposals are not discussed in much depth or detail by the
authors, and deserve a fuller analysis. The idea of permitting the SEC to
operate like a rating agency and to give some issuers better access to the
marketplace than others flies in the face of basic policy decisions made
fifty years ago to substitute full disclosure for merit regulation in the federal securities laws.3 5 The increasing institutionalization of the market
which has led the SEC to the current shelf registration and integrated
disclosure rules should be an impetus to less rather than more investor
protection legislation. Institutional buyers are better able to fend for themselves than are unsophisticated investors. Moreover, not only would the
current political climate-which favors marketplace discipline over government regulation-be inhospitable to the authors' proposals, but there is
no reason to assume that the professional diligence agencies suggested by
the authors would do a more competent job than investment bankers, independent accountants, and counsel have done for fifty years.
The real problem with the current regulatory framework, which the
authors hint at but do not frankly state, is that a serious bear market
could spawn securities litigation which would bankrupt current purveyors
of due diligence. If the kind of strict liability concepts which the courts
have applied to general tort claims were to be applied to cases for misrepresentation in securities offerings, it is doubtful that current diligence
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

P. 172.
See supra note 2.
P. 192.
P. 194.
See In re Universal Camera Corp., 19 S.E.C. 648 (1945).
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practices would be an adequate defense to damages that would be imposed
on accountants, investment bankers, and counsel for many underwritings.
As SEC Chairman Shad stated in his special concurring opinion adopting
the Shelf Registration Rule:
The bulk of shelf offerings to date have occurred during the
broadest and strongest stock, bond and new issue markets in history.
Investors do not seek rescission or other redress, unless the security
declines in price. The test of the shelf rule will come during the next
bear market. 9
Auerbach and Hayes suggest that greater investor protection be purchased by issuers through insurance or letters of credit."' This technique
has been used to satisfy nervous purchasers of municipal bonds. Whether
such an added burden should be placed on the already seriously strained
insurance and banking industries, however, is a difficult question. Because
these very types of institutions are the predominant investors in the securities markets today, perhaps they should bring their skills as assessors of
risk to bear upon their own investment decisions. In other words, perhaps
the appropriate policy response to the situation described by Investment

Banking and Diligence: What Price Deregulation?is not investor protection re-regulation, but a relaxation of due diligence liability to complement the shelf registration and integration rules. It is not obvious that the
financial intermediaries who bring issuers and purchasers of new issues
together are in a better position to guarantee the accuracy and adequacy
of financial disclosure than institutional investors.
The problem with a greater degree of investor due diligence or a return
to caveat emptor in securities regulation, of course, is where this leaves
the individual small investor in a market increasingly dominated by institutional investors. This is the real dilemma confronting policy makers,
who have never been able to decide whether the objective of federal financial institution regulation is to strengthen the national economy by making
the capital markets a more efficient mechanism for allocating capital or to
protect consumers.

39.

SEC Securities Act Release No. 6499, reprinted in [1983-1984 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC.

L. REP. (CCH) 1183,449, at 86,346 (Nov. 17, 1983) (Shad, Chairman, concurring).
40. P. 195.

